90 books in 90 days -- ethics after babel

In Ethics After Babel Stout argues for a melding of Augustinian theology and epistemological pragmatism to recover a rich language for moral discourse in a pluralistic society.   He resists the temptation toward radical relativism in ethics, but recognizes the diversity in contemporary moral language. In part one of Ethics after Babel, Stout defines the problem -- As a consequence of the diversity of moral language, should we abandon the traditional notion of objective and rational moral judgments? (p 13).  In part two, Stout considers the fate of religious contributions to moral discourse in a diverse culture.  Finally, in part three, Stout argues for the recovery of Augustinian theology and the utilization of a modest philosophical pragmatism as a way forward in moral discourse.

Stout makes a careful epistemological distinction between “truth” and "justification" in moral discourse.  He argues that while "truth" is objective, "justification" remains relative -- culturally dependent for articulation.  Thus, we have a sense that some moral judgments are possible, but the “truth” of those judgments remains hard to come by.  We can't remove ourselves from our particular historical and cultural location to see what "God" alone can see -- namely the truth of a moral judgment.  Consequently, there are many languages of morals -- thus the title of his book.

In part two, Stout makes an attempt to recover religious language for moral discourse.  He maintains that many of our current moral languages have been influenced by religion and that there is a unique relationship between religion and morality.  He argues that religion has lost its voice in moral discourse for two reasons.   First, it relies on foundationalist epistemology that tries to abstract universal foundations for moral discourse.  Second, religion has lost its voice because of religious discord -- the inability of religion (even proponents of the same religion) to agree on a definition of the good.  For Stout, a foundationalist epistemology does not take into account that we are always immersed in the assumptions and precedents of a moral tradition.  And religious discord results in a move toward secular language -- seeking something outside religion -- to govern the moral discourse of society.

To recover a rich theological language for moral discourse, Stout affirms Alasdair MacIntyre's "Tradition of Rational Enquiry" -- moral precepts take their place within a tradition's vision of the good life and are subject to innovation, criticism and revision.  Therefore, Stout argues that we need to salvage theology for moral discourse because it will contribute to the strengthening of our moral language -- it will add resources for the moral bricolage that Stout thinks is the best move forward in moral conversation.  This kind of moral bricolage rests in something like Dewey's philosophical pragmatism -- an epistemological framework that stops short of the temptation to define truth and constructs moral discourse fro whatever is at hand.