Cahill can be understood to be working predominately within Stassen's way of reasoning dimension of his character ethics grid, and with the principles vector. This is important for understanding what she is doing, for although she has Christ's incarnation and attention to the embodied needs of real people as an "all-inclusive love" (p 122) for a theological foundation, she is not primarily speaking about Christ-likeness. Her theological description talks about God paying attention to the outcast and contradicting exclusive hierarchies. But Cahill makes equal use of feminism and Catholic Natural Law theory to help construct a practice-based approach and an inductive objectivity. This is a way of reasoning.
This way of reasoning highlights the need for Christians to practice a public or cross-cultural language in a manner that Cahill describes as "sympathetic relations" (p 53). It is a "general to objective" method (this is similar to Traci West's particular to universal approach that she advocates in Disruptive Christian Ethics -- this is no surprise since both women, Cahill and West, draw on feminist theological approaches to personal agency) that sees an objective reality present in particular embodied realities. Thus, she continues to advocate a natural law, but it is bottom up, inductive natural law reasoning from embodied experiences, not deductive "top down" from select minds. This is a fusion of feminism and Catholic natural law that creates a better universal than what advocates of Kantian universals have provided. Kantian absolutes that grounded reality and moral knowledge in rationality have been problematic because they attempted a language that did not take into account the communities that form us. But the language of rights and justice have been derivative of the Enlightenment project that Kant's project depended upon. The difference now becomes the manner in which we arrive at universals. Cahill's practice-based approach stresses the need to practice revisable, evaluative judgments, from embodied experience, in order to provide common ground for ethical critique across traditions, to advocate justice in other contexts.
Communitarians (Hauerwas and MacIntyre) also resist Enlightenment universals, and with them, the language of rights and justice. But, communitarian theology is burdened with the problem of correcting its own errors. How does a tradition correct errors within its own tradition? That's the fundamental question I posed to Hauerwas in our seminar in Theological Ethics all those years ago. Both Hauerwas and MacIntyre don't seek to have conversation outside of their tradition, and thus cannot talk about wrong in another context. Yet, "the only sure way to break the hold of distorted communication [from within ones' community] is to constantly engage perspectives from outside any given tradition" (p 42). This will also allow inter-cultural dialogue about well-being.
This is the bulk of what Cahill's book is about. In a practice-based approach, Cahill dispenses with the errors of Kantian minimalism, and "neo-scholastic deductive casuistry" in order to promote human flourishing (the language of Aristotelian/Thomistic natural law), while not succumbing to the nihilism of postmodern deconstructionism that ends up reinforcing the oppressive structures it rails against by leaving us with no language to confront it.