90 books in 90 days -- obligations

Michael Walzer's Obligations:  Essays on Disobedience, War and Citizenship is a collection of essays about consent theory.  Democracy rests on the notion that power is derived from the consent of the governed, and that once power is consented to, the governed are obligated to obey.  The formula, as Walzer describes it, goes something like this:  I have committed myself (consented):  I am committed (obligated) (page x).  But that is not a clear-cut occurrence, for we do not always agree on the democratically elected leaders, but we give consent and agree on the process.  Thus, consent also occurs within degrees.  Yet, what is it that we consent to, and to what are we obligated?  In the context of the federal government, or the state (what Walzer calls our primary group affiliation), what do we make of those whose consent is not given?  To what and whom are they obligated?  Put differently, in the course of the democratic process, what if my choice was not the popular one (that is of course if I was given a choice)?  Walzer's response to this has to do with the manner in which he interprets what really happens today with regard to citizenship . We are in fact pluralist citizens (pp. 203-227).  We are "communal citizens" who maintain membership in multiple communities or groups, the largest and most inclusive being the state (p. 218).  But that is not the only group to which we consent and incur obligations.  For, as citizens, we also actively govern ourselves in other secondary groups "that sometimes play an informal, sometimes an official, role in determining state policy" (p. 219).  The recognition that we are pluralist citizens is a safeguard against tyranny, terrorism, and totalitarianism as it maximizes the voices of the governed, allows space for civil protest by supporting the recognition of multiple voices within the political process in order to maximize democratic representation, and limit the sphere of primary group political influence for the sake of honest dialogue and genuine democracy. P ut differently, more voices are heard demanding accountability, and thus democracy is enabled to represent more of its constituency within the population of the governed.

But how do we give consent and incur obligations within the various groups?  It is not enough to claim that being born an American, or to a family with a particular party affiliation means that I have consented and incurred obligations.  And contrary to John Locke who argued that our remaining in a country of origin incurs obligations (pp. 18-19), Walzer relies on Jean Jacques Rousseau's notion of "social contract theory" for his understanding of consent and obligations:  "contract theory clearly applies best", Walzer argues, "to those sects, congregations, parties, movements, unions, and clubs in which individual choices are made explicit, acted out in some public fashion" (p. 9).  This sort of "acting out" as Walzer describes, occurs within the secondary group affiliations he refers to by reference to the list he provides in the above quote.  We consent publicly to membership in secondary groups, where membership and ideals are explicit.  To be sure, inherited memberships can be seconded by voluntary participation and thus incur strong obligations.  But there remains a need to publicly express ones consent and incur behavioral expectations from fellow group members.  These are obligations.  They require moral seriousness; an awareness in their members of the purpose and actions to which they may become committed to (p. 21).  The presence of secondary groups in society makes us able to regard our primary group as a group of consenting adults (p. 19).  Sometimes the obligations of the secondary group will conflict with the primary group affiliation, as was the case in the civil rights movement for black church members, or during the Vietnam War for many conscientious objectors.  But the secondary group does not make total claims upon its members; they do not ask for a new government.  In recognition of the goods that the government does provide they make partial claims that the government recognize their authority in some particular area of political life and thus, limit its own (p. 11).  And in the case of the oppressed minority, or the conscientious objector, the secondary group speaks as a representative in the larger context on behalf of its members to allow their voices to be heard, and justice to be done (p. 50).  Thus, we have a participative democracy made up of consenting adults who incur and carry obligations towards one another.